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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Special Verdict rendered by
a civil jury on the 10th day of April, 1987, and a judgment
entered therein on the 7th day of May, 1987.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent

asks

that

the

judgment

of

the

District

Court be affirmed.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following the entry of judgment, the appellant filed
a

Notice

of

269-270).
Trial

Appeal

on

June

2,

1987

(Record,

Vol.

6,

pp.

On May 4, 1987, appellant filed a Motion for a New

(Record, Vol. 6, pp. 144-145).

On May

19, 1987, the

Court denied plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Record, Vol.
6, page 225).
Amend Judgment

On June 2. 1987, appellant filed a Motion to
(Record, Vol. 6, page 249).

the trial court denied
page 278).

the Motion to Amend

On August 4, 1987,
(Record, Vol. 6,

On August 24, 1987, appellant filed a second Not-

ice of Appeal (Record, Vol. 6, page 281).
Appellant

has filed

a Motion to Consolidate the two

appeals for purposes of briefing.

Pursuant to the provisions

of Rule 4(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Notice
of Appeal filed prior to the disposition of the Motion for a
New Trial and the Motion to Amend the Judgment has no effect.

and the new Notice of Appeal is the only one that presently
confers jurisdiction upon this Court, and is the only one to
be considered in this appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Respondent

does

not

elect

to

restate

the issues,

since appellant is bound by its own statement of issues.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
"Jane Doe" was a passenger on a motorcycle drive
her husband.

The motorcycle was involved in an accident

an automobile driven by Melvin Reeves.

Melvin Reeves subse-

quently died for reasons unrelated to this case, and the defendant herein, Shirlene Hafen, was substituted

as personal

representative ad litem for the Estate of Melvin Reeves.
The case was tried to a jury in the Fifth Judicial
District Court, in Washington County, at St. George, on April
8, 9, and 10, 1987.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of

"Jane Doe", and assessed

damages

in the amount of $10,000

special damages and $20,000 general damages.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent
appellant.

accepts

the

Statement

of Facts

of the

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I
Prior to voir dire examination of prospective jurors,
plaintiff
tions^
with

submitted

a series

of requested

voir dire ques-

The Court examined each of those and discussed them

counsel, and

declined

to ask questions

pertaining to

matters of privacy of the jury, or questions that would not
shed light on the bias, prejudice or impartiality of the jurors, but which were covered substantially in the interrogation of the jurors conducted by the trial judge.
The Court refused to ask improper questions pertaining to insurance matters as being inviolation of Rule 411 of
the Rules of Evidence and the prior decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court.
pertaining

to

The Court further refused to ask questions
an

alleged

"insurance

crisis" or

"liability

crisis."
The questions declined by the Court were in conformity with prior case law. Rule 411 of the Rules of Evidence,
and the responsibility of the Court to avoid the injection of
prejudicial questioning or statements being given to the jury.

Point II
The refusal of the Court to ask prospective jurors
questions concerning alleged "tort reform propaganda" and the
"insurance crisis" were in conformity to the case law of the
State of Utah, and in accordance with the broad discretion of
the trial court in the conduct of voir dire requests.

Such

requests were unsupported
applicable

by any case or statutory authority

to this trial court, nor were they persuasive

in

exposing potential prejudice.

Point III
The claim

that

defendant

tried

to mislead

the

jury

into thinking that a "sick old widow" would be responsible to
pay the judgment is spurious and not borne out by the record.
The record shows that the widow of Melvin Reeves was allowed
by the trial
voir

dire

counsel

court

to sit at counsel table only during

examination

in selection

of
of

the

prospective

jury, and the

jurors,

jury was

to

the

assist

specifically

informed that she was not a party to the action but was the
widow of Melvin Reeves.

Point IV
The

accusations

borne out by the record.

of

character

assassination

are

not

The only indication of the smoking

and alcohol drinking by the plaintiff were contained in hospital records filled out and signed by the plaintiff, and were
not called to the attention of the jury.
The

Court

declined

to

allow

the

admission

of

the

evidence of possession of marijuana by the plaintiff.
The Court specifically prohibited counsel from making
reference to any premarital sex shown by the records and exhibits admitted into evidence.

The

admission

into

evidence

of

the

records

showing

that the plaintiff had had a miscarriage prior to the accident
and

a voluntary

sterilization

after

the accident

being examined by psychologists was admitted

and

before

into evidence as

being relevant and material to the claim of the plaintiff to
neuropsychological

injury, and was in no respect a character

assassination.

Point V
The claim of surprise testimony is invalid, in view
of the fact that the records submitted were the medical records of the plaintiff herself, subpoenaed from the Dixie Medical Center

one year

prior

to trial, and

that

plaintiff

had

access to those records and had failed to disclose the fact of
the miscarriage and the voluntary sterilization to counsel and
to her psychologists.
tiff's

counsel

available

to

methods.

They

through
plaintiff
cannot

Said

records were available to plain-

normal
without
be

discovery
the

considered

methods,

necessity
as

and

were

of

discovery

surprise

testimony

under the case law cited in the brief.

Point VI
The introduction of the medical records is only corroborative of plaintiff's own testimony admitting, under oath,
that prior to the accident she had had a miscarriage and that
after the accident but before examination by the psychologist
she had had a voluntary sterilization conducted

at the Dixie

Medical Center.
not

objected

The medical records corroborate that and were

to

except

on

the

basis

of

surprise,

limited objections as to deletion of the words
"smoking" from the records.

and

with

"alcohol" and

As such, the medical records are

not prejudicial, but are factual circumstances germane to the
defense

of the claim

of neuropsychological

injury,

and were

properly admitted.

Point VII
Testimony

of the lay witness Dennis Parker was con-

elusory and was without foundation.

When objected

fense

failed

counsel,

plaintiff's

counsel

to

to by de-

establish

the

foundational basis of personal observation or other basis for
giving the conclusory remarks.
admitted

Nevertheless, the evidence was

into the record, and was not an error committed

by

the trial court.

Point VIII
The

alleged

claim

expenses is without merit.

of

exclusion

of

future

medical

The doctor's testimony was to the

effect that in "the most adverse expression" of the development
tion.
ty.

of her

injuries, there might need

to be another opera-

He could not say that there was more than a possibiliAs

such,

appropriate.

the

exclusions

and

rulings

by the Court

were

Point IX
Appellant

raises an objection to Instruction No. 22

given by the Court for the first time on appeal;

such objec-

tion cannot now be considered.
Appellant

further objects to Instruction No. 23, but

the objections voiced at trial were not supported by any basis
for the objection, and thus there was no opportunity for the
trial Court

to correct

the

instruction.

Instruction No. 23

was a fair statement of the law and did not effect any prejudice to the plaintiff's case.

Point X
The objection to the testimony of the treating doctor
was due to the leading and suggestive nature of the question,
and was sustained by the Court.

Plaintiff's counsel did not

restate the question in an acceptable manner, nor lay a foundation

that

the

doctor

was

qualified

matters sought to be elicited
error.

to testify

from him.

as

to the

Thus, there was no

In addition to that, the doctor was permitted to tes-

tify to the substance of the same material following the objections;

thus, no error was committed

and no prejudice was

effected against the plaintiff.

Point XI
The verdict
evidence.

of the

jury was fully supported

by the

The testimony of the plaintiff herself contradicted

the testimony of the economist as to lost earnings.

The tes-

timony of plaintiff's neuropsychologist refuted the same witness1 own testimony of the necessity for future medical treatment.
court.

There were no prejudicial errors committed by the trial
The plaintiff had a full, fair, and complete trial in

this matter.

Point XII
The Court entered a valid judgment in the case, which
provided for interest as provided by law, which would encompass the award of prejudgment interest on special damages for
past medical expenses.

The Court did not err by failing to

grant prejudgment interest.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
"JANE DOE" WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ASK
SOME OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED QUESTIONS
TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS.
Prior to the commencement of the examination of the
prospective jurors, plaintiff had submitted to the Court voir
dire requests (Record. Vol. 5, pp. 238-243).
In a conference in chambers prior to the commencement
of the interrogation of jurors, the Court specifically examined and then addressed the Court's intent with regard to that

requested voir dire examination.
conference,

the Court

As part of that in chambers

specifically

advised

plaintiff's

coun-

sel: "If I don't ask the question in general or specifically
or

close enough, you

tions."

(April

can request me that

8 Tr., 7:22-25)

I ask those ques-

The Court then went through

each of the plaintiff's requests and indicated which would be
given and which would be denied.
Thereafter, when

convened

in open

court,

the trial

judge went through a thorough and probing interrogation of all
of the jurors as to numerous questions bearing on the qualifications of the jurors to sit as unbiased and impartial

(April

8 Tr., pp. 13-46).
The Court then inquired of counsel if they had additional

questions

43:7-8).

to be presented

to the

jury

(April

8 Tr.,

Upon such request by counsel, the Court again quer-

ied the jury as to additional matters and again asked counsel
if

there

43:23).

was
After

specifically

anything
all

else

questions

declined

to
had

be

offered

been

in the conference

(April

asked,

8

except

in chambers

Tr.,
those

(supra),

counsel for plaintiff passed the jury for cause (April 8 Tr.,
46:10-11).
Thereafter

in

chambers,

plaintiff's

counsel

made a

motion for a mistrial on the failure of the Court to give the
voir dire questions previously ruled upon by the Court (April
8 Tr., 51:23-25, 52:1-17).
The requested voir dire questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 6. 9
and 11 were properly denied by the Court as not being proba-

tive of matters that would shed light on the bias, prejudice,
or impartiality of the jurors, or were covered

substantially

in

by

the

interrogation

of

the

jurors

conducted

the

trial

judge (April 8 Tr., pp. 13-46).
As to Question 3 regarding age, obviously plaintiff's
counsel could view the jurors and could approximate their ages
without

a specific

closure

lend

any

disclosure,
clarification

nor would
of

the

such

specific

suitability

of

dissuch

juror to sit on the jury.
Question
prejudice

or

11 is not a questin pertaining

impartiality,

counsel to bracket

but

is an attempt

by

to bias or
plaintiff's

in the minds of the jury a high value to

the case, and was properly refused.
Questions 23, 24, 39 and 40 were calculated

to cir-

cumvent the prohibition of Rule 411 of the Rules of Evidence,
which prohibits the introduction of evidence as to insurance.
The

impropriety

of such voir dire questions

numerous decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.

is supported

by

In Robinson v.

Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1961), the Court said:
We do not depart from our former position:
that the question of insurance is immaterial
and should not be injected into the trial;
and that it is the duty of both counsel and
the court to guard against it.
In

Ellis

v. Gilbert,

19 Utah

2d

189. 429

P.2d

(1967), the Court said:
We here observe that neither in the order of
the trial court nor in this decision, is it
postulated that information concerning insurance should be disclosed to the jury.
(Footnote at 3)

39

Footnote 3: That introduction of the question
of insurance into the trial is held to be
prejudicial error. [citations omitted]
In Young

v. Barney,

20 Utah

2d

108, 433 P.2d

846

(1967), the Court said:
The safeguarding against disclosure to a jury
of
insurance
coverage
in personal
injury
trials is a very touchy subject which lawyers
and judges have always been obliged to handle
with such caution as to justify use of the
metaphor "walking on eggs". The understanding
has always been that it was prejudicial error
to deliberately inject insurance into such a
trial.
Whether that injection comes in the trial during the
course of admission

of evidence

in violation of Rule 411 of

the Rules of Evidence, or through voir dire examination of the
jury, the prejudicial effect of injecting the insurance factor
into the trial is just as damaging.
That the prohibitions against such disclosure applies
to voir dire examination of the jury is illustrated in Tjas v.
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah, 1979), where the Court said:
Additionally, as part of the claim for failure
to provide a fair trial, appellants contend
that the trial court during voir dire failed
to ask the jurors guestions which he requested.
These guestions particularly as they
raised the issue of insurance, are and were
properly refused as this Court has previously
indicated:
That the question of insurance is immaterial
and should not be injected into the trial;
and it is the duty of both counsel and the
court to guard against it.
Id at page 440.

Questions

25

and

26

as

to

contingent

fees have no

probative value as to impartiality of the jury.
Questions 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 36. 37. 38 and
41 have to do with the so-called

"insurance crisis" and are

more specifically dealt with under Point II of this brief.
In State v. Balle. 685 P.2d

1055

(Utah. 1984). the

only Utah case cited by appellant, allegedly supportive of his
claim of error, in fact is damaging to plaintiff's appeal in
this case.
should

It reiterates the basis for which a trial

conduct

voir

dire

examination

of prospective

judge

jurors.

At page 1060. the Court said:
The gathering of sufficient relevant information must, of course, be pursued with a sensitivity to the privacy of the potential juror.
Judge Harding in this case did exactly that, when he

The Court:
I am afraid you have met a judge
who believes in the privacy of the jury and I
believe they have a right of privacy.
I believe you have a fair right of inquiry.
(April 8 Tr.. 8:6-9)
The Court in State v. Balle went on to say at page 60:
The trial judge, in his broad discretionary
power to conduct voir dire [citations omitted], has a duty to protect juror privacy.
Tias v. Proctor,

supra, and

State v. Balle. supra,

both confirm that the inquiry conducted by Judge Harding over
33 pages of transcript into the qualifications of prospective
jurors was conscientiously

and properly conducted

in compli-

ance with the case law and the discretion afforded the trial

judge in such matters.

There was no error in the refusal to

ask the questions complained of by appellant.

POINT II
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF VOIR DIRE QUESTIONING OF
THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS CONCERNING "TORT REFORM
PROPAGANDA" WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE UTAH COURTS, AND DID NOT DENY
"JANE DOE" A FAIR TRIAL.
Plaintiff cites as authority for appellant's contention that the Court should have allowed the voir dire of the
jurors as to whether or not they were a shareholder in an
insurance company the case of Kilpack v. Wiqnall, 604 P.2d
462, 643 (Utah, 1979).
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court made reference
to the fact that the first trial of the matter had ended in a
mistrial when counsel for defendants objected to the voir dire
by plaintiff1s counsel as to whether the jurors had connections with the Casualty Insurance Company.
After the second trial and on appeal, the Court reversed the case on the basis that reasonable minds could not
differ, and that the actions of the defendants in the case
constituted

negligence and the seven-year-old

child was not

guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The issue of voir dire examination of the jury as to
connections with the casualty insurance was never ruled upon
by the Court in the case, and only incidentally mentioned in a
footnote

citing Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d

224

(1932) for the proposition that a plaintiff would be entitled
to know a juror's interest
pany.

in an insurance or casualty com-

In the Balle case, the Supreme Court said at page 230:
The company was a local one, and it was entirely possible that some of the jurors might
have been interested or connected either as a
stockholder or an agent or debtor or creditor
of this company.
The plaintiff was entitled
to learn whether such relationship existed.
Such voir dire examination of the jurors was dicta in

the case, for at page 229 the Court said:
Counsel for plaintiffs insisted he had a right
to pursue that line of questioning, and stated
he would confine himself strictly to determining if any juror was interested as a stockholder or officer, employee, debtor or creditor of Intermountain Lloyds...
The Court went on to say, however, that
The plaintiff, however, is not the appellant,...so that that particular ruling of the
Court in refusing counsel permission to ask
the question is not directly involved on this
appeal.
In the Balle case, because it was a local company and
there was a considerable possibility

that prospective

jurors

might be stockholders, agents, employees, debtors or creditors
of

that

insurance

have asked

company,

the question

it may

about

such

have been permissible
connection.

However,

to
in

the case at bar there is no evidence that such local company
status prevailed, and there was no basis for requesting that
question.
When Kilpack and Balle are examined
Tjas
ruling

v.

Proctor,

in Robinson

supra,

which

v. Hreinson,

-14-

specifically
supra,

that

in the light of
reaffirmed
such voir

its
dire

questioning

of

clarification

the
is

jurors

provided

is

immaterial

to

the

the

and

not

citation

permitted,

in

State

v.

Balle, supra, to the fact that
The trial judge, in his broad discretionary
power to conduct voir dire,...[citations omitted] has a duty to protect juror privacy.
The trial judge in the case at bar examined the voir
dire requests of plaintiff and correctly denied such requests.
The questions
28

- 34, and

clearly

36

intended

requested

by plaintiff's

counsel Nos.

- 41 are clearly objectionable.

They are

to place before the jury the spector of an

insurance crisis.
To determine if they have been "tainted" by the articles attached

to plaintiff's

brief on appeal as Exhibit A;

the trial court would have had to inquire of the jurors as to
their reading of said articles.
If you ask the jurors to examine or to consider the
materials
ganda",

set

once

forth
they

in

have

the

alleged

been

asked

advertising
to

read

or

or

"propa-

examine

the

allegedly offensive articles, that juror has then been tainted
by having read such articles and would be subject to challenge
for cause.
Appellant cites no Utah authorities approving of such
voir

dire

interrogation

Yost, 594 P.2d
jurisdictions

of

prospective

jurors.

Borkoski

v.

688 (Mont., 1979) cited by plaintiff cites the
of California,

Kentucky, Missouri, North Caro-

lina, Texas and the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit as
holding such inquiries to be reversible error.

The case then

cites Arkansas, New York, Kansas and Connecticut

for presum-

ably holding contrary.
In Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d
Court

declined

to

reverse

for

failure

330 (Or., 1964), the
to provide

such voir

dire examinations and said:
In the ordinary case, the presence or absence
of insurance is not only irrelevant but the
unnecessary injection of the subject into the
trial is prejudicial.
The Court

in that case held that the requested voir

dire inquiry was improper.
The Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494, 71 Cal. App.
3rd 484 (1977) cited by plaintiff in support of such questions
as to the malpractice insurance crisis being improper, wherein
the Court said:
We find, however, that the trial judge properly used his discretion to limit the voir
dire in this case.
The proposed voir dire
question would have injected into the present
case unnecessary emphasis on the subject of
malpractice insurance...for it is likely that
the panel would have surmised that the plaintiff was discussing the overall medical insurance crisis only because the defendant was
similarly insured, (emphasis added)
The
voir

dire

footnote

examination

to that
question

case

shows that

substantially

the

requested

encompasses

the

requests submitted by plaintiff, which was properly denied by
the trial judge in the case at bar.
Of note, the Borkoski court said at page 695:
Therefore, we further hold that, as a prelude
to any questions concerning whether a potential juror has read or heard anything to indicate that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in
personal injury cases result in higher insur-
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ance premiums for everyone, an attorney must
ask certain general introductory questions.
These initial questions may be approached from
two directions:
(1) Whether the prospective
juror has heard of or read anything (not necessarily related to insurance) which might
affect his ability to sit as an impartial
juror (as was done by the trial judge in this
case) or ... (emphasis added)
If, however, no positive response was received
to these introductory inquiries, there is no
reason to pursue further the line of inquiry
we have approved above.
The foregoing are all subject to a showing
that counsel is acting in good faith and is
not merely attempting to impress on the jury
the fact that defendant may be covered by
insurance.
In the particular case at bar, the trial judge. Judge
Harding, in his questioning of the prospective jurors said, at
April 8 Tr., page 42:24
Is there anything in any of your backgrounds,
any experience or anything you have heard or
read or seen that would cause you to be affected, or would affect you in the amount of
compensation that you might award in a case?
Anything in your background that you feel
would affect you in a determination of the
amount of compensation you might award in a
case?
OK, the record may reflect that there
is no indication.
Thus,
jury, almost
the Montana

in

a

preliminary

exactly parrotting
court

in Borkoski.

question

submitted

the recommended
the

trial

court

to

the

procedure of
received

no

affirmative responses, and as stated by the Borkoski court, no
positive

response having been received

to these

introductory

inquiries, there was no reason to pursue further that line of
inquiry.

As pointed

out

in State v. Balle, supra, the trial

court has a broad discretion with regard to voir dire examination

of the

jury.

dire

questions

as

Examination
to

the

of plaintiff's

issue

of

the

proposed

alleged

voir

"lawsuit

or

liability crisis" and the effect of advertising on the insurance rates has been consistently rejected by the Utah courts.
Certainly a more searching inquiry into the reading habits and
articles alleged to be offensive and affecting the bias of the
jury would have clearly created a prejudicial bias against the
defendant in the case, and would have led the jury to surmise,
as

stated

in Barton v. Owen,

supra, that

the plaintiff

was

discussing the insurance crisis only because the defendant was
insured.
The denial

of the voir dire requests were not only

within the discretion afforded

the trial court, but were re-

quired to prevent prejudice from being injected into the trial.

POINT III

THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT TRIED TO MISLEAD THE JURY INTO THINKING
THAT A "SICK OLD WIDOW" WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE
TO PAY THE JUDGMENT.
In his Point III, the appellant first creates a straw
man

and

then

attempts

to blow him down.

Appellant

that there was insurance coverage of $100,000.

contends

While that is

not a part of the record of the proceeding and is not relevant
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to this

inquiry,

such is the fact.

Appellant

contends that

the insurance carrier had $100,000 at risk but the estate had
no financial risk at all.
The record shows that in his closing argument, plaintiff's counsel asked the jury to enter in the special damage
question $124,927 (April 10 Tr.. pp. 125. 132).
In addition to these special damages, counsel asked
the jury to make a further award for general damages, suggesting,

improperly,

a per

diem

argument

for

the depression of

$1.00. $10.00. or $25.00 per day for the previous five years
and for the future.
Whether the estate was substantial or not is immaterial.

The estate was at risk.
Prior

to the commencement

of the trial, plaintiff's

counsel filed a motion to exclude Florence Reeves from sitting
at counsel table.

The Court considered that motion and denied

it (April 8 Tr.. page 2 ) :
As far as her coming and sitting at counsel
table. I will permit her to be present during
the voir dire of the jury for purposes of
permitting her to assist counsel in the selection of the jury, in view of the fact that she
is the only heir of the estate of Melvin
Reeves and is therefore in the best position
to assist counsel in making that deterrainaton.
(emphasis added)
Prior

to

first

examination

plaintiff's

counsel then requested

to

the

explain

presence

of

prospective

jurors.

an admonition to the jury

of Florence

dire examination (April 8 Tr.. page 6 ) :

Reeves

during

the voir

I think if the Court feels obligated to introduce her to the jury, that the court should
advise the jury at that point, so there is no
misunderstanding, that she is not a party to
this case and that there is no showing -there is no reason for the jury to suppose or
guess or speculate that she is going to have
to pay any money.
The Court agreed to that request, and gave the clarification to the jury (April 8 Tr.. page 46):
Ladies and gentlemen, one last matter here
initially.
Seated, as indicated, immediately
to the left of Mr. Jeffs is Florence Reeves.
She is not a party to this action.
She is.
however, the widow of Melvin Reeves, and this
suit involves Mr. Melvin Reeves, who died not
related to this accident, but he died after
the accident, and she is present here, (emphasis added)
Immediately
Court,
they

and
had

after
been

after

she had

the
been

identified

to

voir

dire

questioning

identified
her.

in

to the

compliance

by the

jurors and
with

the

Court's initial ruling that she could assist with the selection

of

the

jury,

she was

excused

and

left

the

courtroom.

(April 8 Tr.. 47:2-4)
Although she had been deposed some two years earlier
as a courtesy to counsel and without notice, she was intended
to be a witness at the trial as the only witness available to
the defense who saw the accident.
happening.

Her health prevented

such

As an officer of the Court, defense counsel gave

as his reasons for not producing Florence Reeves as a witness
her fragile health.
to as Exhibit A ) .

(April 9 Tr.. pp. 204-205. attached here-

This writer
the matter.

has

found

no Utah

decisions

discussing

Appellant has cited but one case, and that from

the Supreme Court

of Michigan

from 1965.

In that case, the

issue was not the allowance of the widow at counsel table for
assistance in selecting the jury in a locality unfamiliar to
counsel, as in the case now at bar, but was maintained at the
counsel table, was introduced by defense counsel as the widow
of the deceased, and the matter of her presence there or the
fact of her not being a party to the suit was never explained
to the jury.
the

trial,

trial.

Despite several objections during the course of
she

remained

at

counsel

table

throughout

the

That case is not applicable to the case now at bar.
Parenthetically,

it

should

be

noted

that

in

the

introducton of the parties, the plaintiff was not present in
court, but her husband, who was no longer a party in the proceeding, was introduced

by plaintiff's counsel.

"Jane Doe's"

husband sat at counsel table not only during voir dire examination, but during various stages of the trial.

(April 8 Tr.,

page 13).
In

appellant's

argument

on

this

point,

appellant

makes assertions that there was an attempt by defense counsel
to mislead the jury into thinking that the widow was responsible

to

pay

the

judgment.

That

is

not

supported

by

the

record, but only by assertions made out of the presence of the
jury

by

plaintiff's

counsel

(April

8 Tr., page

6) and

was

fully explained by the Court to the jury before the completion
of voir dire examination.

In plaintiff's

argument asking the Court

to exclude

Florence Reeves from the courtroom and from the counsel table,
plaintifffs counsel makes accusations that her presence was an
attempt
pay

to influence the jury into believing that she was to

any

argument

judgment.
of

No where

defense

in the briefs nor

counsel,

nor

there any reference whatsoever

in

any

in the oral

presentation,

was

to Florence Reeves except for

the utilization of her help in the selection of jurors during
voir

dire, as specifically permitted

by the Court.

She was

then taken from the courtroom and never returned to the presence of the jury.
Plaintiff's argument that "Why should defense counsel
be

able

to

convey

the

same

message

by

a charade

or

play-

acting?" is creating a paranoid characterization that defense
counsel might have argued that
widow's pocket, when

judgment would come from this

in fact no such argument

was ever held or suggested to the jury.
by appellant
posed,

or discussion

That is, the effort

is to set up a straw man of a potential, sup-

implication

from Mrs. Reeves' presence at the counsel

table during voir dire, and is an inference that was not present

in the courtroom,

nor was it made in any respect during

the presentation of the case.
The

Court's

attention

is

No. 2 given by the trial court

also

drawn

(copy attached

to

Instruction

as Exhibit B)

wherein the trial court specifically pointed out that Shirlene
Hafen was made the defendant in the action because she was the
representative of the estate of Melvin Reeves, and if plain-
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tiff

should

be awarded

judgment

it would

be awarded

against

the estate of Melvin Reeves (Record, Vol. 6, page 95).
The Special Verdict
even propose

that

submitted

the judgment would

to the

jury does not

be against

the estate.

The Special Verdict sought only the finding of the questions
of whether Melvin Reeves had been negligent, and whether that
was

a proximate

amount

of

construed

cause

those

of

the

injuries.

by the

plaintiff's

Such

jury to mislead

injuries, and

presentation

could

them as asserted

not

the
be

in plain-

t i f f s Point III.

POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS
ADMISSIBLE AND WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE, AND
DID NOT CONSTITUTE CHARACTER ASSASSINATION.
Plaintiff claimed that she had symptoms of depression
and other symptoms, demonstrating a neuropsychological

injury

to the brain, attributable to the accident.
The plaintiff had the burden of proving by a preponderance

of

the

injuries were
matter

of

the

evidence
caused

by

lawsuit.

that

the

claimed

neuropsychological

the

accident

which was

The

defense

is entitled

the

subject

to present

evidence to refute such claims, or evidence which would have
the tendancy to cast doubt on whether the plaintiff had sustained her burden of proof of showing causal relation of the
claimed neuropsychological injury to the accident.

The issue of whether the plaintiff smokes or does not
smoke was never presented in testimony to the jury.

The only

involvement of the question was that on page 10 of a 12-page
document of the medical records of the plaintiff (Exhibit 7).
a preoperative information sheet filled out by the plaintiff
herself, by a series of circled answers to 25 questions, the
plaintiff circled

"yes" to the question "Do you smoke?"

No

mention was made in oral testimony to such fact, nor was any
oral argument ever presented or raised with the jury as to
such fact.
With regard to the drinking of alcohol, in the same
medical records on the same information sheet, the plaintiff
answered the question "Do you drink alcohol?" with a circled
"yes."
document

On other medical records, on page 12 of a 22-page
introduced

as Exhibit

6. the similar

preoperative

information filled out by the plaintiff to the question "Do
you drink alcohol?" was again answered "yes."
No mention was made in oral testimony or in argument
or presentation to the jury with regard to the drinking of
alcohol.

The trial court required excising of the handwritten

word "alcohol" in the margin of the record, but allowed the
questions and answers on smoking and the use of alcohol to
remain on the preoperative information sheets as a part of the
medical records.
The

(April 10 Tr.. pp 15-16).

Court

further

allowed

plaintiff1s

counsel

to

substitute for the hospital records a photocopy with the hand-
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written notation of "alcohol" blanked out so that it could not
be read by the jury.
After hearing in camera both from plaintiff's expert
Dr. Gummow,

and from the plaintiff herself as to her use of

marijuana, the Court prohibited submission to the jury of her
prior use

of marijuana, holding

that

the prejudicial

effect

outweighed the probative value despite the prior marijuana use
and its potential effect on the plaintiff's depression.
No questioning was undertaken in the presence of the
jury as to the plaintiff's prior use of marijuana, or as to
the expert's opinion of the effect of marijuana on plaintiff's
depression.

As

such,

the

issue was

jury (April 10 Tr., page 13).
ted to the

never

presented

to the

Such issues were never submit-

jury in oral argument or in presentation of evi-

dence.
With

regard

to premarital

sex,

the

hospital

record

exhibits show that on March 3, 1980 plaintiff had a spontaneous

abortion,

Although

which

the testimony

occurred

at

two

months

of the plaintiff

showed

of

gestation.

that she had

been married just one month prior to the spontaneous abortion,
the trial

court

correctly permitted

the

introduction

of the

medical records showing the spontaneous abortion, but prohibited counsel from questioning the plaintiff regarding premarital sex
any

(April

10 Tr., 53:19-23).

of the questioning

ments, nor was
premarital sex.

No reference was made in

of the witnesses, nor

anything presented

to the

in oral

argu-

jury pertaining to

With regard to the spontaneous abortion, reference to
which

appeared

(Exhibit

in

the

records

6), plaintiff's

the use of the words

refer

to

the

All

and

argument

in

the

Dixie

Medical

Center

counsel urged the Court to prohibit

The Court required defense counsel to

abortion

137:3-12).

the

"spontaneous abortion", but to refer to

it as a "miscarriage."
so

of

refereces
of

as

a

miscarriage

in the

counsel

(April

interrogation
referred

9 Tr.«

of witnesses

to the

spontaneous

abortion as a miscarriage, at the request of plaintiff's counsel.
Plaintiff's

expert. Dr. Gummow,

on

crossexamination

admitted that she had not been informed of the miscarriage or
sterilization until the night before her trial testimony.
doctor

further

admitted

that with

some women,

The

a miscarriage

can produce depression, and further admitted that a voluntary
sterilization can produce depression in some women.
mow further

testified

Dr. Gum-

that at no time during her testing in

1986, nor in the testing by her colleague Dr. Nielsen, did the
plaintiff ever disclose to them the miscarriage or the voluntary sterilization, which occurred post-accident.
Dr. David Weight, defendant's expert, testified

that

the depressions which plaintiff was suffering could be caused
by anything which would cause a person to grieve.
testified
provided

that

some

of

the

factors

that

the

He further

plaintiff

had

to him to indicate a possible source of the depres-

sion she was suffering were the lack of stability of her marriage

(April

9 Tr., page 265), continued

litigation problems.

concern that she was not working at her previous level, that
she was not happy in her present circumstances.
At no time during Dr. Weight's

examination

did the

plaintiff ever disclose the miscarriage or the voluntary sterilization that occurred after the accident

(April 9 Tr., page

266).
Dr. Weight

further testified

that the decision on a

voluntary sterilization is very important in a person's life,
and

that

second

sometimes

thoughts

people

or

regrets

make

the

decision

thereafter.

and

then

Dr. Weight

have

further

testified that if he had been aware of the miscarriage or the
sterilization,

he

would

have

gone

into

those

matters

very

deeply to determine whether or not those two factors were the
cause of her depression (April 9 Tr., page 267).
The issue of the miscarriage prior to the accident,
and the voluntary sterilization thus become material issues to
the causes related by the plaintiff
was

the fundamental

symptom

in her depression, which

evaluated

by plaintiff's

expert.

Dr. Gummow, in determining that plaintiff had suffered a brain
deficit.
The Court thus concluded

that the issue of the mis-

carriage and the issue of the voluntary sterilization became
relevant and material to the issues of the plaintiff's claims
of

depression

brain

injury,

being
and

the

fundamental

whether

it was

symptom

causally

of

the

alleged

connected

to the

accident or eminated from causes extraneous to the accident.

Upon

crossexamination,

plaintiff

was

asked

whether she had had a miscarriage in March, 1980.
mitted

that

she

had

(April

10 tr. , page

60).

about

She ad-

When asked

whether it was upsetting to her, she admitted that it was very
upsetting.
When asked whether she was frustrated for not being
able to carry the baby full term, her answer was: "I wasn't
frustrated;
61:1-3).

I was

(April

10 Tr.. 60:11-25,

She still admitted feelings from that miscarriage.
She

July.

devastated."

1983,

further
she

admitted

had

62:13-21, 63:7-12).

had

a

on

crossexamination

sterilization

(April

that

in

10 Tr.,

She admitted that she did not remember

telling Dr. Neilsen or Dr. Gummow about the sterilization or
the miscarriage

(April 10 Tr., page 64).

Part of Exhibit 7

was a sterilization permit dated August 25, 1983, signed by
the plaintiff, by which she granted permission for the sterilization.

The permission reads:
It has been explained to me that I will probably be sterile as a result of this operation,
but no such result has been warranted.
I
,l
,,
understand that the word
sterilitv
means
that I may be unabl e to inseminate or conceive
or bear children if said oper:ation is successful. I also unders tand that this procedure is
generally irreversible. I voluntarily request
the operation.
(emphasis added) [page 4,
Exhibit 7]
Plaintiff's

alleged

character

assassination

is not

that at all. No reference was made in testimony or oral argument

that

premarital

the
sex,

plaintiff
or used

smoked,

drank

marijuana.

alcohol,

The

only

engaged

in

reference to

smoking and alcohol was contained
formation

sheet

filed

with

in the plaintiff's own in-

the Dixie Medical

Center

at the

time of admission to the hospital, as referenced above.
medical
and

records

voluntary

and

testimony

sterilization

pertaining

directly

to

The

the miscarriage

relate

to

the

primary

symptoms, and are the medical records of the plaintiff.
When

plaintiff

appears

before

the

Court

and

claims

that she suffers from depression, and through the use of her
experts alleges that this occurs as a result of the accident,
defendant

is entitled to submit to the court medical records

and other evidence to demonstrate that there are primary and
direct

causes

of depression unrelated

to the accident

may be an explanation for the claimed symptoms.

which

In addition,

the inferences drawn from such information could well and did
presumably lead the jury to conclude that she did not suffer a
neuropsychological
lated,

or could

injury

in the accident, but that this re-

relate, to the instability

of her marriage,

the prior miscarriage, and the voluntary sterilization.
The claim that the limited

information

submitted

to

the jury produced prejudicial effects in view of the "ultraconservative Mormon

community"

of St. George

jectural on the part of counsel.

is purely

con-

This writer1 s experience in

St. George would lead him to conclude that it is a retirement
community that attracts people from all over the United States
because

of

its

weather.

There

is

no

evidence

before

the

Court, in fact or in truth, that St. George is an "ultraconservative Mormon community."

There is no indication to think that the jury which
was empaneled was prejudiced by the information on the hospital records that plaintiff smokes or drinks.
prejudice

is merely

amply demonstrated

conjectural
that the

at best.

facts about

Such presumed

The trial court
the plaintiff are

admissible in evidence because they are relevant and material
the inquiries to be submitted to the jury.

Plaintiff's own

testimony that she was "devastated" by the miscarriage, and
the impact of the voluntary sterilization are subject matters
required to be submitted to the jury, in view of the plaintiff's claims of depression.
Plaintiff's

argument

suggests

that

the

jury could

have drawn its own conclusions, and that is the very function
of the jury.

The accusation of character assassination is not

borne out by the record.
court

limited

the

The record reflects that the trial

introduction

of

evidence

to the medical

records as they existed, and the interrogations pertaining to
the effect of the miscarriage and the voluntary sterilization.

The presentation of such evidence was a matter-of-fact

presentation to explain the depression.

It can in no way be

characterized as character assassination.
In

this

case,

plaintiff

brought

suit

claiming

a

neuropsychological injury, and asked for an award of hundreds
of thousands of dollars.

The medical records of the plaintiff

herself, and her own testimony, amply demonstrate that the two
events are unrelated

to the accident.

It would

have been

reversible error for the trial judge to have denied such rele-

vant and probative evidence from being admitted to explain the
depression to which she was laying claim.

POINT V
"JANE DOE" WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY ANY
SURPRISE TESTIMONY.
In appellants
defense

submitted

Point

V.

surprise testiomony

to the accident, and a voluntary
one

year

after

examination

appellant

the

by

accident

and

plaintiff's

asserts

the

of a miscarriage prior

sterilization
a

that

year

approximately

before

her

psychologist.

first

Appellant

characterizes this as "surprise" testimony.
As stated by appellant, "Jane Doe's" expert testified
that the most severe symptom of the alleged brain damage was
depression.

Plaintiff,

injury,

placed

has

by

her

alleging

medical

the

neuropsychological

records,

pre-accident

and

post-accident conditions as relevant to the inquiry.
The
(Record.

complaint

Vol.

1,

pp.

in

this

1-3).

case was
At

least

filed
by

July

that

1, 1983

point,

and

probably prior thereto, plaintiff's counsel had access through
the plaintiff to all of the medical records of the plaintiff.
On April 22, 1986, just under one year prior to the
trial of this matter, defendant took the records deposition of
the Dixie Medical Center

(Record, Vol. 3, pp. 145-146;

Vol.

6, pp. 219-220).
Coincident

with

that,

defendant

issued

a

subpoena

duces

tecum

for

the

records

of

the

Dixie

Medical

Center

(Record, Vol 6, page 221).
A letter was sent to Dixie Medical Center reguesting
such

medical

records,

with

a

(Record, Vol. 6, page 222).
Notice

of

Records

copy

to

plaintiff's

counsel

A copy of the subpoena and the

Deposition

were

also

submitted

to

plaintiff f s counsel.
Thus, at least one year prior to trial, plaintiff's
counsel had notice that defendant was obtaining and examining
all

medical

records

on

the

plaintiff.

If

the

information

pertaining to the miscarriage and the voluntary sterilization
came

as

a

surprise

to

plaintiff's

counsel,

it

is

only

a

surprise because of his failure to examine medical records to
which he had access long before defense counsel did.
In
testimony

addition

to

that,

pertaining

to

the

sterilization
understanding

was
of

the

information
the

inform

her

counsel

case,

it

does

plaintiff

of

not

facts
lie

"surprise"

miscarriage

and

within

knowledge

herself.

germane
in

so-called

the
If

to the

counsel

to

voluntary

she

failed

issues
try

and
to

in this

to

shift

responsibility away from plaintiff and attempt to place it on
defense counsel.
have

been

There was no surprise that could not readily

examined,

and

for

which

plaintiff's

counsel

had

access long before defense counsel.
The
medical

objections

records

objections

to

were

the

a

of

plaintiff's

surprise

admissibility,

to

counsel

counsel

since

such

are

that
not

the
valid

information

was

readily

available

to

plaintiff's

counsel.

It was

probably

already within the confines of their medical file at the time
it was subpoenaed by defense.
The

issue

been whether
accident.
and

in this case from the very

the neuropsychological

That was an issue framed

in the pretrial

prior

to

the

sterilization
issue.

The

order.

accident,
subsequent

inception has

injury was caused by the
in the amended

complaint

The evidence of the miscarriage

and

the

to

the

evidence

of

accident

the

bear

voluntary
upon

that

issue of causation was always before the Court,

and is not a new theory, as purported by appellant.
Anderson v. Bradley,

590 P.2d

339

(1979) frames the

issue and the applicable law.

The allegation therein was that

the

the

officer's

hospital
way.

testimony

that

that he saw the car but

plaintiff
could

told

not

get

him at the
out

of its

The Court held that that statement was not necessarily

inconsistent

with the officer's testimony

had sprinted across the road.

that the plaintiff

The Court held that that was a

jury prerogative to weigh that evidence.

The Court held that

that was not surprise, and said:
In any event, surprise as a grounds for a new
trial is only that which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against. The surprise
claimed here may not be so catagorized, since
it could have been easily guarded against by
utilization
of
available
discovery
procedures. (emphasis added)
In the instant case, not only did plaintiff's counsel
have

the

cooperation

available
of

discovery

the plaintiff

procedures,

in providing

but

consent

had

the

to obtain

any

medical

obtain.
prior

records

Plaintiff's

to

trial

that

that

plaintiff's

counsel

had

defendant's

notice

counsel

desired

virtually

counsel

had

one

to
year

subpoenaed

and

obtained the medical records of the Dixie Medical Center.

As

such, the claim of surprise is not appropriate.
In the case at bar. there was no attempt to conceal
the acguisition of the records one year prior to trial, nor to
prevent

access

by plaintiff's

counsel, which

could

not

have

been accomplished in any event.
Plaintiff

cites Eagle v. American

Tel. & Tel. Co..

769 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985) for the proposition of surprise.
In that

case, at a summary

judgment

hearing

an attempt

made by the plaintiff to advance a new theory of damages.

was
In

the instant case, the dispute as to causation of the alleged
neuropsychological

injury was always present from the time of

the filing of the answer denying the brain injury having been
caused

by

the

accident.

Such

case

is

inapplicable

to

the

issue here.
The further case cited by the plaintiff of Conway v.
Chemical Leaman Tanklines. Inc.. 687 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1982)
points out that

"The surprise, however, must be inconsistent

with substantial

justice" in order to justify a grant of new

trial.
That
Utah

Rules

of

ruling
Civil

is

consistent

Procedure:

with

"Action

our
or

Rule

59(a)(3)

surprise,

ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."

which

The claim of surprise in this matter is an attempt by
appellant
inform

to shift

her

from

counsel

presentation

of

responsibility
be alerted

of

her

the plaintiff
all

case,

to undertake

the responsibility

material

matters

and

plaintiff's

from

relative

to

to the

counsel

the

ordinary discovery process or to

by the discovery

initiated

by the defense and to

examine the medical records obtained thereby, which had always
been available to plaintiff's counsel.
Plaintiff
A.2d

279

(N.J.

cites the case of Sacawa v. Polikoff, 375

Super.

doctor defending

1977),

for

the

proposition

that

the

a medical malpractice case failed to reveal

that he had taken x-rays of the plaintiff.

As such, the facts

are distinguishable, because here the medical records are not
those taken by the defendant at defendant's request, but are
the medical records of the plaintiff herself, within her own
knowledge and availability.
The

citation

to

The citation is not applicable.
Walker

v.

Distler,

296

P.2d

452,

again a medical malpractice case, the doctor failed to answer
that

the

patient

had

pre-eclampsia.

This

information

was

peculiar to the doctor who was being sued in the malpractice
case, and would not be necessarily within the knowledge of the
plaintiff herself.
to

the

records

situation
available

However, and as such, it is not applicable
here, where
to

her

it

which

is the plaintiff's
were

utilized

to

medical
show

the

probable cause of the depression which she claimed.
The claim of surprise

is unsupported

and not a basis for reversal by this Court.

by the record,

The claim of surprise in this matter is an attempt by
appellant
inform

to shift

her

from

counsel

presentation

of

responsibility
be alerted

of

her

the plaintiff

all

case,

to undertake

the responsibility

material

matters

and

plaintiff's

from

relative

to

to the

counsel

the

ordinary discovery process or to

by the discovery

initiated

by the defense and to

examine the medical records obtained thereby, which had always
been available to plaintiff's counsel.
Plaintiff
A. 2d

279

(N.J.

cites the case of Sacawa v. Polikoff, 375

Super.

doctor defending

1977),

for

the

proposition

that

the

a medical malpractice case failed to reveal

that he had taken x-rays of the plaintiff.

As such, the facts

are distinguishable, because here the medical records are not
those taken by the defendant at defendant's request, but are
the medical records of the plaintiff herself, within her own
knowledge and availability.
The

citation

to

The citation is not applicable.
Walker

v.

Distler,

296

P.2d

452,

again a medical malpractice case, the doctor failed to answer
that

the

patient

had

pre-eclampsia.

This

information

was

peculiar to the doctor who was being sued in the malpractice
case, and would not be necessarily within the knowledge of the
plaintiff herself.
to

the

situation

However, and as such, it is not applicable
here, where

it

is the plaintiff's

medical

records available to her which were utilized to show the probable cause of the depression which she claimed.
The claim

of surprise

is unsupported

and not a basis for reversal by this Court.

by the record,

POINT VI
"JANE DOE" WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE MEDICAL RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE .
Without reiterating the argument set forth in Point V
as to the surprise matter, it is readily apparent by examination

of

the

crossexamination

of

Dr.

Linda

Gummow,

and

the

direct examination of Dr. Weight, cited in Point V, that the
failure

of the plaintiff

to disclose

to either

psychologist

the devastating effect of the miscarriage in her life prior to
the

accident,

and

the

obviously

more

devastating

effect

of

voluntary sterilization was a concealing from both experts by
the plaintiff of significant factors impacting upon her symptomatic

depression.

Both

psychologists

testified

that

some

women uffering a miscarriage may suffer depression from such
fact, and that the recognition by a woman that the voluntary
sterilization

is

irreversible

and

that

she will

never

bear

children and thus not be a whole woman, constitutes the required
whether

and

supportive

the plaintiff

expert

testimony,

has established

evidence that the neuropsychological

casting

doubt

on

by a preponderance

of

injury was caused by the

accident.
The plaintiff's

own testimony as to the devastating

effect of the miscarriage and her admission of the voluntary
sterilization,

coupled

with

the

signed

document

executed

by

her at the time of the sterilization acknowledging the steri-

lization

to

be

irreversible

and

a

permanent

prevention

of

child bearing, provide ample support for the medical testimony
and the inferences to be drawn thereby by the jury (Exhibit 7,
attached as Exhibit C ) .
The failure
the

examining

sterilization

of the plaintiff

psychologists
could

the

be construed

to disclose to any of

prior

miscarriage

and

the

as indicative of an attempt

to prevent the trier of the fact from discovering the truth of
the matter

as to those

devastating

occurrences unrelated

to

the accident.
Because

of

that

failure

to

disclose.

Dr.

Weight,

called by the defense, correctly indicated that he could not
rule

out

the

possibility

accident,

but

voluntary

sterilization

that

if he

that
had

the

depression

known

he would

of

from

the

the miscarriage

and

certainly

came

have

explored

in

depth to find out if that was the cause of the depression, and
not the accident.
of

the

plaintiff,

Such failure to disclose, and the testimony
raise

substantial

serious

doubts

in

the

minds of the jury, and could cause the jury to conclude that
the neuropsychological

injury did not emanate from the acci-

dent, and that plaintiff had not met her burden of proof.
In this case, the

jury entered a verdict of $30,000

in favor of the plaintiff.

It may well be that the jury con-

cluded
shoulder

all

issues

injury

as

to

favorable

neuropsychological

injury

and

the

to the plaintiff, but did not be-

lieve the plaintiff's testimony as to the amounts she claimed
for damages, and awarded what, in the jury's mind, was a rea-

sonable

amount

to

be

awarded

for

such

injuries.

Appellant

cannot contend that they were prevented from receiving a just
verdict by the jury, when she received a $30,000 verdict.
As pointed out by appellant's brief, "Jane Doe's" own
expert testified that she could form no opinion as to whether
the

sterilization

or

miscarriage

caused

the

depression

or

guilt in "Jane Doe" (April 9 Tr., pp. 122-123).
In Kimes v. Herrin, 705 P.2d 108 (Mont. 1985). cited
by plaintiff, the issue submitted to the jury was whether the
father's drinking and associated family fighting were relevant
injuries claimed by the plaintiff.

The case is totally dis-

similar to the facts before the Court in this case.
Appellant contends that the lack of medical testimony
linking

"Jane

depression

Doe's"

for

which

miscarriage
she

and

suffered

countenance the concealing

sterilization

is

asking

this

to

the

Court

to

of vital information from the ex-

perts, and to submit an unfounded claim of neuropsychological
injury.
The citation of appellant to Pearce v. Wistesen. 701
P.2d

489

(Utah,

1985) is inapplicable.

sought

to be

gested

remotely

effect

on the body.

issue
causes

introduced
in

time

and

evidence

the effect of alcohol

beyond

the

realm

of

in-

physical

In the case now before the Court, the

is the depression
(instability

concerned

There, the

of

occasioned
the

a potential

marriage,

multitude

miscarriage,

of

voluntary

sterilization, and perhaps even the auto accident).

In view

of

of

"Jane

Doe's"

own

testimony

as

to

the

effect

the

miscarriage and sterilization, it can hardly be said that such
evidence was not relevant to the inquiry as to the cause of
the depression symptoms.
Appellant cites McCormick, Sec. 313. 3rd ed., 1984.
on the issue of whether an opinion offered by a hospital record without the possibility of crossexamination is permissible.

In this case, the hospital records were merely confirm-

atory of testimony of the plaintiff herself, admitting that
she had had a miscarriage prior to the accident and a voluntary sterilization subsequent to the accident and before her
first

examination

by a psychologist.

were asked or produced

As such, no opinions

by the hospital records.

factual records received as business records.

They were

Such records

were not objected to on the basis of their being an opinion,
as cited in appellant's brief, nor on any foundational basis,
but only on the basis of surprise and relevance.
The Court correctly ruled that they were relevant to
the inquiry and that they were admissible.
The Court1s attention is called to the Pearce case,
supra, wherein the Court said:
This Court has followed the general rule that
the trial court's decision to admit or exclude
evidence will not be reversed unless it abused
its discretionary powers, [citations omitted]
The Court went on to say, at page 492:
If evidence has some probative value but has a
tendancy to unduly prejudice or confuse the
issues or to mislead the jury, the trial court
must balance the probative value against those
countervailing factors to determine whether
the evidence should be admitted. "Precedent,M
-40-

concluded the Court in Carlson, is of little
value in reviewing such cases.... We simply
determine whether on the facts of the particular case, the trial court's ruling was
within the reasonable or permissible range
[citations omitted]
It is the contention of the defendant
that

the Court

siderations
error.

judiciously

and

admitted

and
the

in this case

carefully weighed
evidence

now

those con-

claimed

to

be

It was within the discretionary authority of the court

to admit such evidence, having concluded that it was relevant
to the inquiries and claims of the plaintiff, in view of the
crossexaraination of plaintiffs own expert prior to the introduction of such evidence.
As stated by the Court in Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Sheilds, Inc., 790 F.2 817 (10th Cir. 1986) at page 826 relevant evidence must be "substantially outweighed" by the danger
of confusion or delay to justify exclusion.

In this case, the

trial court concluded that the evidence was material and relevant and should not be excluded.
The Court is cited also to Thompson v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 688 P.2d 489

(1984), wherein the Court

The issue of causation in this case is not a
matter of such technical sophistication as to
be solely within the realm of expert opinion.
Instead, it is a fact question of whether
plaintiff's disabilities were attributable to
the condition or to some preexisting condition. Expert testimony can be helpful in such
a situation, but it is not, as the plaintiff
suggests, conclusive, [citations omitted]
Also,

the Court

is cited

to Dixon v. Stewart,

P.2d 591 (Utah, 1982) wherein the Court said:

658

In general, expert testimony is admissible
when (1) it appears that the matter before the
jury is not within the knowledge of the
average layman or concerns a subject not
within
average
experience,
and
(2) the
testimony is such that it will be an aid to
the jurors regarding the issue before them.
Whether or not these two criteria are met is a
matter to be determined by the trial court,
which is given considerable discretion.
Both the testimony of the plaintiff herself and the
testimony

of

the

experts

corroborate

the

relevance

and

materiality of the testimony as to the miscarriage and the
sterilization, and refute the claim of error in admitting such
evidence.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING LAY
OPINION TESTIMONY. THE TRIAL COURT ONLY REQUIRED A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE TESTIMONY
OF THE LAY WITNESS.
In regard

to

the

testimony

of Dennis

Parker, the

Courtfs attention is called to the Transcript of April 9, page
28, where the Court said:
I am going to allow you to have the witness
testify as to contact he has observed, and he
is limited to that ability. Counsel, so if you
want to ask him those kinds of questions.
Then counsel asked whether he knew of any difficulty
"Jane Doe" had

had

in her family

relationships

before and

after the accident.

It was objected to on the basis of no

foundation,

as

inasmuch

counsel

-42-

had

not

laid

a foundation

showing any personal observation.

The Court then ruled (April

9 Tr.. 29:23-25):
Well. I think we need to have some time frame
foundation information. Counsel.
In response thereto, counsel said the time frame was
two or three years, and he wanted to compare before and after
the accident.

He did not set a time when the witness made any

observations, who was present, where it occurred, or anything
of the normal and necessary foundational basis.
al

objection

was made

(April

The addition-

9 Tr.. 30:10-15).

The Court

again reiterated that counsel needed to narrow it down as to
who was present.

Then Mr. DeBry. in a leading guestion (April

9 Tr.. 30:24). said:
Have you noticed any difficulty, based on your
observation comparing the time period before
and after the accident that ["Jane Doe"] has
had
in family
relationships
with
father,
mother.
sisters.
brothers.
aunts. uncles,
nephews, husband, any of the above?
A: Yes.
An objection was made to that by defense counsel, and
overruled by the Court.

The question was allowed to remain.

Thus, appellant's contention that the witness was not allowed
to

testify

32:1-8).

is not

borne

out

by

the

record

(April

The witness then testified:
To answer the question, they. ["Jane Doe's"]
younger sister is my age. so -- and so I did
know ["Jane Doe"] and her family years previously which -- they don't associate with very
much.
I have only seen her probably twice in
the last five or six years, actually with
["Jane Doe"].

9 Tr..

To come off with the other side of the family,
they were very outspoken with Justin1 s side of
the family.
They would go up there every
weekend or twice a week.
An objection was made by defense counsel:
Mr. Jeffs: Your Honor, he has testified while
she was there, he has not identified whether
he was present at all.
Court:
The objection is sustained.
have him answer more direct questions.

Let's

It was very obvious to the Court and defense counsel
that plaintiff's counsel was not asking when the observations
took place, where he was. who was present, what he observed,
but only conclusory statements as to whether she was having
family difficulties or depression or other problems.

As such,

no adequate foundation was laid, and the sustaining by the
Court of the objections was fundamental and proper.
The

plaintiff's

counsel

was

never

precluded

laying a foundation to ask the questions and

from

to establish

whether or not the witness had the ability to observe that
which his conclusory statements suggested.
The Court

in this case did explain the basis that

there had not been sufficient

foundation.

On several occ-

asions, the Court pointed out that plaintiff needed to establish time, place and circumstance, which were never asked by
plaintiff's counsel.

Thus, no foundation was laid.

No issue was ever raised that opinion was to be given
by a lay witness, as permitted by Rule 701.

It never got to

that point, because the witness did give conclusory opinions
without the necessary laying of the foundation.

-44-

An examina-

tion of the record

(April 9 Tr., pp. 29-33) amply illustrates

that the foundational
never
laid.

laid, and

basis for the alleged observations was

thus the predicate

to the opinions was not

Nevertheless, the conclusory

statements were

admitted

in part, even without adequate foundation.
The

Court

gave

reasons

for

the

sustaining

of

the

objections that the testimony was without foundation, and gave
suggestions

as

above

set

forth;

nevertheless,

plaintiff's

counsel did not lay the foundation.
The Court is cited to Utah Department of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d

1031

(Utah,

1984), wherein at page

1036, the Court said:
Admission of any type of testimony requires
the laying of proper foundation to qualify the
witness
to give
the
particular
testimony
sought to be elicited. No foundation was laid
or sought to be laid regarding Jones1 qualification to testify regarding the highest and
best use of the subject property.
That exact circumstance prevails here:

plaintiff did

not lay the foundation to show that the witness had the necessary competence to render whatever opinion was intended to be
elicited.
The Court is also cited to Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corporation, 27 U.2d 198, 493 P.2d 1283, wherein the
Court said:
Whether the allowance of such testimony, which
we will have characterized as borderline, is
unfair and harmful depends on the particular
circumstances and must necessarily be left
largely within the discretion of the trial
court.

The claimed conclusory statement that the witness had
observed the relationships of the plaintiff to her family were
not predicated by a foundational base showing how such conclusions were arrived at.

As stated in Hansen v. Hansen, 110

U.2d 222. 171 P.2d 392 (1946):
Certain answers to questions involve surmise,
hearsay and conclusions. The Court did not
err in not receiving them into evidence.
Indeed, the Court could not base any finding
upon such answers without indulging in speculation.
Such was the case in this situation.

Without laying

a foundation, any questions precluded were properly precluded.

The plaintiff was not prejudiced thereby.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY
EVIDENCE OF FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES.

EXCLUDE

Appellant opines that the Court sustained an objection to the treating doctorfs testifying as to the surgical
fees for a future operation, because the probability of the
future

surgery was not greater than 50%.

That

is not the

basis of the court's action when examined in the light of the
testimony.

The Transcript of April 8, p. 93 reads:

Doctor, to a reasonable medical probability,
what is ["Jane Doe's"] prognosis or prospect
for the future with respect to her shoulder
and her collarbone injury?
A: Well, I expect that over the next few
years, it will be pretty stable and continue
pretty much like it is. There is the potential for progression of traumatic arthritis,
which is wear and tear arthritis at that joint
where the collarbone and shoulderblade meet.
It doesn't necessarily have to develop, but it
wouldn't be unusual if it did. At this most

-46-

extenuating and adverse expression, she might
need another operation which would be removal
of the outside half inch of the clavicle to
prevent contact rubbing and irritation. That
is only possible, and I wouldn't say that it
was any more possible than 50%.
(emphasis
added)
On

that

answer,

plaintiff's

surgical fees for such an operation.

counsel

asked

for

the

In view of the doctor's

characterization that the shoulder would be "pretty stable and
continue much

like

it is," that

there was a "potential

for

traumatic arthritis, but it doesn't necessarily have to develop," and that "at its most extenuating and adverse expression"
she might need another operation, the testimony was not that
such future operation was with reasonable medical probability,
but

only a possibility at the

expression."

"most extenuating

and

adverse

On that basis, it was not within the realm of

permissible evidence to testify as to the cost of such surgery.
The Court then allowed

counsel to go on and develop

the potential for future arthritis set forth in the questions
and

the

doctor's

94:7-25).
prevented

answers

Thus, the
from

claim

submitting

medicals is not valid.

were
of

the

to the

admitted

(April

appellant

that

they were

an opinion

on future

jury

8

Tr.,

Their claim that they were prejudiced

by not being allowed to present such claim is not valid.
As pointed out in Robinson v. Hreinson. supra.
Of course, no award for damage should be based
on mere speculation or conjection. There must
be a firm foundation for any award by proof
that at least more probable than not that the
damage will be suffered. For this reason the
jury should not be allowed to assess future
damages on probability, but only such damages

as it believes from the preponderance of the
evidence the plaintiff will, with reasonable
certainty, incur in the future.
The Court is also cited to Jamison v. Utah Home Fire
Insurance Co. . 559 P.2d 958 (1977), wherein at page 961 the
Court said:
In this connection, it is also pertinent to
observe that the general rule is that an award
of damages cannot properly be made on mere
possibility or conjecture, there must be a
firmer foundation. That is. any such award,
must be supported by proof upon which reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could believe
that it is more probable than not, that damage
was actually suffered.
The doctor testified

that at the "most extenuating

and adverse expression11 she might need an operation, and that
that was only possible.

That does not comport with the re-

quirement in Jamison that it must be more probable than not
that the damage was actually suffered.
See also Alverado v. Tuckett 2 Ut.2d 16, 268 P.2d $86
(1954), wherein the court said:
The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the
charge of speeding, such a finding could not
be based on mere speculation or conjecture but
only on a preponderance of the evidence. This
means the greater weight of the evidence, or
as sometimes stated, such degree of proof that
the greater probability of truth lies therein. A choice of probabilities does not meet
this requirement. It creates only a basis for
conjecture on which a verdict of the jury
cannot stand, (emphasis added)
The objections sustained by the Court were within the
guidelines

and

discretion

ruled upon by the Court.
ing.

of

the Court,

and

were

properly

No error was committed by such rul-

See also Robinson v.Hreinson, supra.

-Aft-

POINT IX
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT ON DAMAGES
WERE NOT IMPROPER.
Appellant
given by the Court
rect

statements

contends

that

Instructions

No. 22 and 23

(Record, Vol. 6, pp. 116-117) were incor-

of the law.

With regard

to Instruction No.

22. the record shows that plaintiff did not object and cannot
therefore raise the issue for the first time on appeal.

The

objections voiced by the plaintiff are set forth in Transcript
of April 10, pp. 112-113.
As to Insruction No. 23, the total objection was as
follows:
As to Instruction No. 23, again it speaks in
terms of reasonable medical certainty instead
of reasonable medical probability.
No
objecting

to

additional

objection

was

given

Instruction No. 23, merely

as

that

a

basis

for

statement.

No

citation was given to Court upon which it could predicate any
evaluation of the claimed objection.
The Instruction apparently was drawn by the Court not
from reguests submitted by either of the parties but from the
Court's

own reservoir

of

jury instructions.

The

Instruction

appears to have been drawn from 90.3, Jury Instruction Forms
for Utah, which has parenthetically stated:
You may consider whether any of the above
will, with reasonable certainty, continue in
the future, and if you so find award such
damages as will fairly and justly compensate
the plaintiff therefor.

The footnote to that Instruction in Jury Instruction
Forms for Utah reads:
Note: In regard to future damages, we
phrase, "with reasonable certainty".
the phrase "will probably suffer
future" has been approved by our
[citing Picino v. Utah Apex Mining.
338. 173 P.2d 900]

use the
However
in the
Courts,
52 Utah

While the jury instruction made use of the term "reasonable

medical

certainty",

the

play

on

semantics

between

"reasonable medical certainty" and "reasonable medical probability" is more apparent than real.

As cited in the very case

given by appellant. Picino. supra, there the distinction was
between what may happen and what will probably happen.

The

Court said that the determination should be on the basis of
probability.
That plaintiff did receive an award for medical expenses is demonstrated by the fact that on a stipulation of
medical

expenses of $6,700.00. the jury awarded

special damages and $20,000 in general damages.

$10,000 in
Thus, appel-

lant's claim that the instructon was misleading and required
an undue burden upon the plaintiff to sustain their showing of
damages is refuted.
The court is cited to Robinson v. Hreinson. supra.
where the court said:
For this reason the jury should not be allowed
to assess future damages on probability, but
only such damages as it believes from the
preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff
will with reasonable certainty incur in the
future.

-BO-

The appellant did not provide to the trial court any
basis upon which the trial court could make an evaluation as
to the propriety of the instructions complained

of.

Accord-

ingly, this Court should reject any appeal on such basis.

POINT X
THE JURY WAS NOT PREVENTED FROM HEARING THE
TREATING DOCTORS OPINION AS TO "JANE DOE'S"
ABILITY TO WORK AS A BARBER.
Appellant claims that the treating doctor was asked a
hypothetical question that assumed that "Jane Doe" was trained
as a barber and that a barber spends a majority of her time
with her arms outstretched and raised above her waist.

Appel-

lant claims that that hypothetical question was not permitted.
In fact, the question was not hypothetical
and was answered.

at all.

An examination of the April 8 Transcript.

page 92, shows that the question that was asked was:
Assuming that that's true and assuming that a
barber or beautician would have their hands in
somewhat
this
position
(indicating)(sic)
throughout the course of their work, could
["Jane Doe's"] current condition make barbering more difficult or impossible?
A:

Yes.

The objection was made as follows:
I don't think it's a hypothetical at all. I
think it's asking him a specific question in a
leading or suggestive manner, and I object to
the question on that basis.
There isn't any foundation laid for if any
knowledge he might have that what barbering
requires or doesn't require.

The Court sustained the objection, which was made on
the basis that the question was leading and suggestive.
sel did not

return to the hypothetical

Coun-

question, but then

specifically asked the doctor:
Doctor, does ["Jane Doe"] appear to have any
disability based on the history that was given
you?
A:

Yes.

Q: Would you briefly describe what that disability is?
A: She told me she could not barber and hairdress because of discomfort in her left arm.
And she changed her job and occupation in
response to this and now works in a situation
where she doesn't have to use her arm in an
upstretched and elevated manner all day.
Thus,

the

objection

to the leading

and

suggestive

question was made, the question was reframed to be more specific to "Jane Doe" and her disability, and the question was
specifically answered as to her inability to function as a
barber with her arms in an outstretched and elevated manner.
In the case of Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific
RR Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984), cited by the plaintiff, at
page 1051, the Court stated:
The Utah Rules of Evidence in force at the
time of this trial permitted testimony by an
expert in the form of an opinion if those
opinions were (a) based on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made known to
the witness at the hearing and (b) within the
scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness.
Rule 56(2) Utah Rules of Evidence... The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logi-

_«;9-.

cal nexus between his opinion and the facts
educed roust be established, (emphasis added)
In this
the proffered
knowledge,

case, no effort was made to establish that

opinion was

skill,

"within

experience

or

the

scope

training

of the special

possessed

by

the

witness."
No effort was made to lay a foundation that he had
any

special

expertise

barbering or not.
to her

to know whether

or

not

she

could

do

Despite that fact, the witness did testify

inability to function as a barber, and that was pre-

sented to the jury.

Certainly no error was committed.

Plaintiff also cites the Court to Budd v. Salt Lake
City, 23 Utah 515, 65 P. 486 (Utah. 1901).

The attention of

the Court is called to that portion of the Budd case beginning
at the bottom of page 19, which reads as follows:
As to whether or not a witness is competent to
testify as an expert is a question . . . within
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and
his determination will not be reviewed or
disturbed, unless a palpable abuse of discretion is disclosed.
Certainly
question

being

the

leading

sustaining
and

of

the

objection

suggestive was within

for

the

the

sound

discretion of the trial judge, and should not be disturbed on
appeal.
The

Court

is

also

cited

to

supra, which reiterates that the trial
discretion

in his

must

clear

be

ruling.

a

rulings
abuse

of

during

the

discretion

Robinson

v.

Hreinson,

judge should have the
trial, and
before

that

there

disturbing

his

In view of the

testimony

quoted

above, which was

permitted by the Court to be presented to the jury, and the
failure of plaintiff's

counsel

to rephrase the question as

other than as a leading question, it cannot be said that there
was any abuse of such discretion.

POINT XI
THERE WERE NO PREJUDICIAL ERRORS COMMITTED BY
THE TRIAL COURT.
Without reiterating the arguments set forth in the
prior points, suffice it state that the plaintiff received a
substantial

verdict

of $10,000

special

damages and $20,000

general damages.
The jury disbelieved

"Jane Doe's" expert economist,

who testified that the lost future earnings were predicated
upon average earnings of $14,000 per year projected with inflation.

On crossexamination

(April 9 Tr., 181:12-14), the

economist assumed a full time employment but did not take into
account that the plaintiff had not had full time employment.
He had not checked her actual earnings, either (April
9 Tr., 183:5-8).

He had no knowledge that she was only work-

ing 30 hours per week prior to the accident, and not a 40 hour
week (April 9 Tr., 184:19-22).

He did not compare the projec-

ted earnings of $14,000 against her actual earnings, but projected those lost earnings at an 8% discount rate and came up

-S4-

with $58,000 of projected

lost future earnings

(April 9 Tr..

189:8-14).
He used a 6.22 inflationary factor to project future
earnings, whereas her former employer. Tom Hershey, testified
(April 10 Tr.. 72:16-19) that when she worked as a barber for
him that her earnings were in the vicinity of $400 or $500 per
month, at the most.
His

projections

also

ignored

the

plaintiff's

own

testimony on crossexamination that her haircuts at Tom's Barber Shop were charged at $7.00. and that she got 60% of that
and paid 40% for the chair furnished.
She also testified

that

she quit

barbering

at Guys

and Dolls because she wasn't getting enough time in there to
make a good

income, and left there to work for The Rickshaw

for 30-35 hours at minimum wage (April 10 Tr.. 48:18-24).
The economist

also ignored

the fact that she worked

at Tom's Barber Shop for about four months after the accident,
and

then

she

elsewhere,

terminated

because

she

with
could

him

because

work more

she went

hours and

to work

earn more

money (April 10 Tr.. 71:3-8). and that she did not inform him
that there was anything about the barbering job that she was
not able to handle (April 10 Tr.. 71:9-12).
Under

the

actual

circumstances

where

she

had

never

earned more than minimum wage and rarely got more than 30-35
hours per week, the testimony of plainiff's economist was not
believable that she had lost earnings of $14,000 per year.
Plaintiff's novel but questionable theory that plain-

tiff had suffered

a neuropsychological

brain injury at the

accident, when coupled with the fact of the preaccident miscarriage and the postaccident sterilization, and the instability in her married life, was not believable testimony to the
jury.

The claim that a treatment program would cost between

$60,000 to $90,000 as testified to by Dr. Gummow becomes highly suspect in view of Dr. Gummow* s own testimony on direct
examination, where she said:
Now. do you have an opinion based upon reasonable
neuropsychological
certainty
as
to
whether or not ["Jane Doe"] will improve or
get better with respect to the brain damage?
A:

Yes. I have an opinion.

Q:

What is your opinion?

A: My opinion is that she has recovered as
much as she will or can be expected to do so
due to the amount of time that has elapsed
between the accident. Most brain injury recovery occurs in the first year and a half
after an insult, (emphasis added)
Based upon that information and the testimony of the
plaintiff herself that despite doctor's recommendations testified to by Dr. Gummow that she have psychotherapy, and that
approximately five years had elapsed since the accident, no
treatment had been undertaken.

Those circumstances and the

testimony that she should be given a treatment program costing
sixty to ninety thousand dollars was just speculative, and not
believed by the jury.
With regard to the alleged prejudice, no prejudiced
has

been

brief.

demonstrated

by

appellant's

contentions

in

this

The facts of the matter are that the plaintiff's claim

-Sfi-

of $124,927.00 in special damages was just not believed by the
jury, and was certainly not referable to the accident.
jury's

award

of

$10,000

related

to the actual

The

past medical

expenses of $6,747.67 is a reasonable and appropriate recovery
herein.

POINT XII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FAIL TO PROVIDE FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
The
ment

judgment

as provided

past medical
judgment

by law.

expenses

were

signed by the Court provided for judgThe defendant

incurred

$6,747.67.

stipulated

to the date

The

plaintiff

that the

of entry

of the

claimed

special

damages for loss of future earnings and future medical treatment, for which she would not be entitled to interest.
In the

judgment

entered

by

the Court,

since

it is

provided by §78-27-44 that interest be awarded at 8% per annum
from the date of occurrence on the actual damages assessed to
the date of the judgment, plaintiff would be entitled to interest at 8% on the $6,747.67 from the date of the occurrence
until the entry of judgment.
The
did

not

judgment

include

a

submitted

by plaintiff

calculation

of

through

interest

counsel

pursuant

to

§78-27-44 and therefore the judgment entered by the Court is
the only one submitted that included within it an appropriate
method of awarding interest in accordance with said statute.

54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
the Clerk must include in the judgment signed by him the interest on the verdict and the costs when taxed, as has been
done in this case.

That is all that remains to be added to

the judgment signed by the trial judge in order to complete
the judgment in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure

CONCLUSION
The overall analysis of the transcript and exhibits
in this case demonstrates that the trial judge judiciously,
carefully,

and

with

sensitivity

to the

protection

of the

plaintiff's privacy, limited the evidence to those items which
are

relevant, material, and

germane

to

the

issues

to be

tried.
Appellant makes

the common mistake of viewing the

matter most favorable to the plaintiff when the rules of appellate review require the matter to be reviewed in a light
favorable to sustaining the verdict of the jury.
As has often been stated

by the Supreme Court of

Utah, the transcript and trial must be looked at in an overall
picture to determine whether or not the plaintiff had a fair
trial.

In this case, the plaintiff not only had a fair trial,

but recovered a substantial

judgment of $30,000.

The Court

should now deny the appellant's request for a reversal and new
trial.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of March. 1988.

1

subject with counsel, the parties, or witnesses to this

2

case.

3
4

And we will see you back at three o'clock,
I hope.

5

(The jury was excused.)

6

MR. JEFFS:

Your Honor, I met with

7

Mrs. Reeves last night for about 15 minutes, and I have

8

concluded that I will —

9

her here, I will not call her.

10

as bad as I would like to have
I just do not feel that

she can handle the strain of it.

11

It's one thing to come in and sit for a few

12

minutes, 20 minutes with us; it's quite a different thing

13

to come out and take the witness stand and be subjected to

14

the stress of cross-examination, even as carefully as I'm

15

sure Mr. DeBry would deal with that.

16
17
18

It still is too dangerous and I will not
bring her.
THE COURT:

All right.

I don't think you

19

have any argument from Mr. DeBry on that, and the Court

20

will find that she is not available for —

21

with the rules.

22

published and used in examination here by Mr. DeBry.

23 I
24

in accordance

And that permits her deposition to be

What about Mrs. Hafen?

Why do you want her

here other than to see if she really exists and to see

25 . what s h e l o o k s l i k e , C o u n s e l ?

PyHTPTT W
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MR. DeBRY:
to see if she exists.

Well, your Honor, I would like
I would like to see what she looks

like, and I think the jury is entitled to see that.
It's true that the scope of questions would
be very, very narrow.
she —

I would ask her who she is; if

and if she's the personal representative of the

estate; and

—
MR. JEFFS:

That's on file and of record.

He doesn't need to ask her that.
MR. DeBRY:
sense that —

Well, I need to ask her in the

the other day, as I recall, the Court ruled

that Mrs. Reeves could come in the courtroom but not sit
at counsel table.

That was my recollection.

I may be

wrong.
But Mrs. Reeves did come in the counsel room,
and because we don't have photographs

—

MR. JEFFS:

Your Honor

—

MR. DeBRY:

Let me make a record, a verbal

record.
She came in with an attendant.
terribly frail.

She was

She had an oxygen tube in her nose that

she was grasping for and she sat next to Mr. Jeffs at
23

counsel table, which, for the record, she would have been
t

j

24 , no more than four or five feet from the jury box.

And for

all the world that jury might be wondering or speculating

vj>

206

and by the trappings could very well infer that she was
his client and she hired him and he was protecting her
last penny.
And I think I'm entitled to call the true
client, and if for nothing else, say, "Are you the party
in interest and the client in this case?" and let the jury
look that person in the eye.
MR. JEFFS:

If we named Walker Bank as the

PR ad litem for this proceeding, who would he call?
think that the argument is specious.

It —

not say she could not sit at counsel table.

I

the Court did
She can.

She

considers me as her attorney; she has from the very
inception.
That's why we got in the big fight over them
going to her home the Sunday before the original trial
setting.
idea of —

And I think if he's trying to carry out some
that there is some assets or not some assets,

l

it is not going to be —

it is not a question he could

ask.
MR. DeBRY:

I would not ask that.

MR. JEFFS:

So I don't know that there is any

reason to have_ her here.
THE COURT:

I really don't either, Counsel.

24 i If you had a legitimate purpose, I certainly would -- I
25

would certainly have her here, but simply to establish

4
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INSTRUCTION NO,

^ ^

This is a civil case in which plaintiff, Heidi Neighbor,
seeks a money judgment against defendant, Shirlene Hafen, as Personal
Representative ad litem of the Estate of Melvin Reeves, on account
of bodily injuries which plaintiff alleges were sustained by her
in an automobile/motorcycle collision occurring in St. George,
Washington County on August 15, 1982.
Plaintiff alleges that the collision was caused by
negligence of Melvin Reeves.

Defendant denies Melvin Reeves

was negligent, and claims that the collision

was caused by

plaintiff's own negligence or the negligence of Justin Neighbor.
The foregoing is not to be taken by you as facts proved
in the case, but it is simply a brief and condensed statement
of the contentions of the parties as appears from their written
pleadings in the case.
Shirlene Hafen has been made the defendant in this
action because she is the Representative of the Estate of
Melvin Reeves.

If plaintiff should be awarded a judgment, it

would be against the Estate of Melvin Reeves.

DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER
STERILIZATION PERMIT

Date: V / ^ / f o
Hour

: -j-p-ffr

I^^C .

I hereby authorize and direct Dr. -J&l^f,, / /'
/ /rf^J^l^
and assistants of his choice ,to perform ^he-4©llowing operation upon me at the
Dixie Medical Center:
f7s/i^^
J^.-/S<s1~yy^
/
and to do any other procedure that his judgment may dictate during the above
operation. It has been explained to me that I will probably be sterile as a
result of this operation, but no such result has been warranted. I understand
that the word "sterility" means that I may be unable to inseminate or conceive
or bear children if said operation is successful. I also understand that this
procedure is generally irreversible.
I voluntarily request the operation.

s^ffyiji, //Oj^/.trn^
Signature Witnessed:

BY/ 2>r~^*-^

/?^

I joint authorizing the performance upon my wife (husband) of the surgery consented to above. It has been explained to me that as a result of the operation
my wife (husband) may be sterile.

Signed: r
Signature Witnessed:

